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Klint W. Alexander*
Bryan J. Soukup**
I.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2009, President Barack Obama signed legislation suspending a
pilot program that allowed a limited number of Mexican trucking firms to
operate within designated areas on U.S. soil. President George W. Bush enacted
the program during the last year of his presidency in preparation for a larger,
more inclusive US-Mexican cross-border trucking program. With trucks
carrying 90 percent of the goods traded between the United States and Mexico,
the border-opening program was viewed by proponents of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as an important step in liberalizing trade and
improving relations with Mexico. Opponents of NAFTA, however, have been
critical of the program on the basis that Mexican trucks and their drivers
endanger motorists, threaten national security, destroy the environment and
contribute to the loss of thousands of American jobs.'
Following the suspension of the pilot program, the Mexican government
* Dr. Klint Alexander is Senior Lecturer of International Law and Politics at Vanderbilt
University and a Visiting Fellow of International Economic Law at the Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies, University of London, U.K.
** Bryan Soukup is a Legislative Fellow for the Office of Federal Affairs, City of Los
Angeles, California.
1. Associated Press, Bush Plan to Allow Mexican Truckers Throughout U.S. Draws
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/24/washington/24trucks.html.
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retaliated against the United States by imposing 90 tariffs ranging between 10
and 45 percent on U.S.-produced goods totaling $2.4 billion.2 Though trucking
falls within the services sector, Mexico has targeted its tariff hikes on specific
goods in key states where powerful politicians have been pressuring the Obama
administration to impose tighter limits on Mexican truck traffic. This method of
"cross-sector retaliation" is different from the usual approach in international
trade disputes whereby the injured state retaliates in the same commercial sector
in which the harm occurs, also known as "same-sector retaliation." Cross-sector
retaliation is permitted under international trade rules as an alternative remedy
for smaller states who seek to improve compliance levels among larger states in
asymmetric disputes.3
The purpose of this article is to examine Mexico's approach to U.S.
noncompliance with NAFTA trucking regulations and assess whether strategic
cross-sector retaliation is an effective tool to compel the United States to comply
with its NAFTA obligations. Part II will describe the background to NAFTA
and the U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking dispute. Part II will examine U.S.
policy towards Mexican trucking since the creation of NAFTA and the
implications of the 2001 NAFTA arbitration decision that paved the way for
Mexican retaliation against the United States today. Part IV will discuss the
specifics of the 2007 pilot program and the Obama administration's reasons for
suspending the program. Part V will analyze the concept of strategic cross-
sector retaliation in international trade where smaller states have effectively
utilized this remedy to compel larger states to comply with trade rules in
asymmetric disputes. Finally, this article will discuss Mexico's current program
of strategic cross-sector retaliation against the United States, its political and
economic ramifications, and the likelihood that Mexico's retaliation will change
U.S. policy.
II.
THE U.S.-MEXICO CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING DISPUTE AND NAFTA
A. Origins of the Cross-Border Trucking Dispute
The dispute between the United States and Mexico over cross-border
trucking rights arose following the passage of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act
(BRRA) in 1982. 4 Prior to the BRRA, Mexican and Canadian trucks could
2. Mica Rosenberg, Mexico Tariffs Hit a Diverse List of U.S. Goods, REUTERS, Mar. 18,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52H 1BQ20090318.
3. Klint W. Alexander, Rethinking Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System:
Leveling the Playing Fieldfor Developing Countries in Asymmetric Disputes, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES 507 (Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., 2008).
4. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (1982) [hereinafter BRRA].
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operate freely in the United States provided they complied with U.S. safety
laws. 5
In response to criticism from Canada, President Ronald Reagan lifted the
restrictions on Canadian trucks entering the United States on the basis that
Canada's truck safety standards were similar to those in the United States.
6
President Reagan declared:
I regret that with respect to Mexico there has not yet been progress sufficient to
justify a modification of the moratorium. A substantial disparity remains between
the relatively open access afforded Mexican trucking services coming into the
United States and the almost complete inability of United States trucking interests
to provide service into Mexico.
7
Under the BRRA, Mexican trucks are permitted to operate within
specified commercial zones in four U.S.-Mexico border states - Texas,
California, New Mexico, and Arizona. 8 These commercial zones generally
extend from 3 to 20 miles from the border, reaching up to 75 miles in some
locations.9 Upon reaching the edge of a commercial zone, a Mexican truck is
required to transfer its cargo to a U.S. truck; the U.S. truck then completes the
delivery to the product's final destination.10 Delays in delivery of goods and
5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program:
Trucks Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Border, available at http://www.dot.gov/
affairs/cbtsip/factsheet.htm. The BRRA restricted foreign motor carriers from operating in the
United States, though the President could modify these restrictions at any time. The BRRA
grandfathered in five Mexican carriers that were already operating without restriction within the
United States, but instructed the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to deny permits to all other
Mexican carriers. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (Mex. v. U.S.), USA-MEX-98-2008-01
at T 59 (NAFTA Arbitral Panel, Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
nafta20/truckingservices.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Panel Decision]. The BRRA introduced a
two-year moratorium on U.S.-issued trucking permits from Canada and Mexico. BRRA, supra note
4, at § 6(g)(l).
6. Memorandum from the President on the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, 18 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1180 (Sept. 20, 1982).
7. Determination Under the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982: Memorandum of
September 20, 1982, for the United States Trade Representative, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,721 (Sept. 22,
1982).
8. Mary E. Peters, Sec'y of Transp., & John H. Hill, Adm'r of the Fed. Motor Carrier Safety
Admin., Statement before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Transportation, Housing and
Urban Development, and Related Agencies (Mar. 8, 2007) (transcript available at http://
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/testimony/tst-030807.pdo; see also 49 C.F.RI § 372.241 (2009).
9. See Peters & Hill, Statement before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies. Along the border from the
Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, commercial zones range from three-mile wide strips in some
areas to as much as 75 mile-deep areas in others. The zones encompass nearly all urban areas in the
border region and stretch as far north as the suburbs of Los Angeles in California.
10. The procedure going the other direction is similar. A U.S. trucker drives the freight or
cargo to the Mexican border. At this time a "drayage" driver ferries the goods from the U.S. truck
across the border to a warehouse. At the warehouse, Mexican truck drivers reload the cargo onto a
Mexican truck and transport the goods deeper into Mexico to its final destination. Lowell Powell,
NAFTA Keep on Trucking: Paving the Way for Long-Haul Trucking Operations Bemeen Mexico
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added costs associated with the transfer of goods are common. " These
restrictions were later modified to include exceptions for direct Mexico-Canada
transit and U.S.-owned Mexican trucks. While the changes did not grant
Mexican truckers the same access that Canadian truckers enjoy, the United
States showed that it was willing to open its border to Mexican trucks under
certain conditions.
In 1995, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act (ICCTA).12 The ICCTA authorized the President to lift the
moratorium on Mexican carrier movements beyond the commercial zones if
removal was deemed "consistent with the obligations of the United States under
a trade agreement or with United States transportation policy."' 13 The effect of
the act was to give the President maximum flexibility to implement the trucking
provisions under NAFTA, which entered into force on January 1, 1994.
B. NAFTA and Annex I
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trilateral
agreement that addresses the trade in goods, services, and investment. 14 The
major goals of the agreement are to eliminate trade barriers, promote increased
investment opportunities, and facilitate cross-border movements of goods and
services between the parties. 15 Among NAFTA's 900 pages of rules and
regulations are provisions calling for standardization of members' truck length,
weight, safety, and drivers' licensing requirements. NAFTA Chapter 12
addresses trade in services, and Article 1202 (the National Treatment Clause)
requires the members to treat foreign service providers no less favorably than
domestic service providers. 16 Trucking companies fall under Chapter 12 and
and the United States, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. 467, 473 (2008); Mexico Tariffs Test Obama, LATIN BUs.
CHRONICLE, Mar. 17, 2009, available at http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/
app/article.aspx?id=3235.
11. The Department of Transportation estimates that the requirement to off-load cargo within
25 miles of the border adds $400 million in transportation and warehousing costs annually.
12. Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C) (1995).
13. 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(3) (2006).
14. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 LLM. 289
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
15. Id. art. 102(1) (describing the agreement's objectives, including creating efficacious
proceedings for implementing the Agreement).
16. Id. art. 1202. The National Treatment Clause provides:
1. Each Party shall accord to service providers of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own service providers.
2. The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraph I means, with respect to a state
or province, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded, in
like circumstances, by that state or province to service providers of the Party of which
it forms a part.
[Vol. 28:2
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are thus protected under the National Treatment Clause unless the company's
activities violate local health and safety laws. 17
Article 1203 - the Most-Favored-Nation Clause - requires the member
states to treat foreign service providers from a fellow member state no less
favorably than a service provider from another member state. 18 Accordingly,
the manner in which Congress modified the BRRA to permit Canadian trucks,
but not Mexican trucks, to travel freely throughout the United States was in
violation of this provision.
NAFTA Annex I set forth a two-step schedule for liberalizing cross-border
trucking between the United States and Mexico. 19 The first step required the
United States to provide Mexican trucks with complete access to its roadways in
the four border states - Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona - by
December 18, 1995.20 The second step called for Mexican trucks to be able to
travel freely throughout the United States by January 1, 2000.21 At the time
NAFTA was signed, the United States was committed to implementing both
steps of the program on time. However, the Canadian plan was the only plan to
progress on schedule. The Teamsters and other groups in the United States were
opposed to the plan because of safety and other political concerns. 22
On December 15, 1995, President Clinton ordered that the U.S. border
remain closed to Mexican carriers beyond the designated commercial zones.
23
According to one White House official, "[a]ll we need is one big environmental
disaster, or one of these trucks plowing into a school bus, and all of a sudden
NAFTA is going to look like a pretty disastrous idea." 24 Teamsters president
James P. Hoffa hailed the decision, exclaiming, "[n]o longer will companies be
allowed to use NAFTA to take our jobs and endanger our health and security." 25
Mexican officials denounced the decision and initiated a Chapter 20 arbitration
17. Id. art. 1201. Further, Article 904 permits a member state to impose legitimate safety
requirements. Id. art. 904.
18. Id. art. 1203. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause provides that "[e]ach Party shall accord to
service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to service providers of any other Party or of a non-Party."
19. Id. Annex I.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Dana T. Blackmore, Continuing to Put the Brakes on Mexican Truckers: Will the U.S.
Ever Implement NAFTA Annex I?, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 699 (2003).
23. David E. Sanger, US. and Mexico Postpone NAFTA on Truck Crossings, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1995, at BI0, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/19/us/us-and-mexico-
postpone -naifta-on-truck-crossings.html?page wanted=1.
24. David E. Sanger, Dilenma for Clinton on NAFTA Truck Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995,
at 136 of NY Edition, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/17/us/dilemma-for-clinton-on-
nafta-truck-rule.html?pagewanted- 1.
25. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Delays Opening Border to Trucks from Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2000, at Al0, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/08/us/us-delays-opening-border-to-
trucks-from-mexico.ht ml?pagewanted =1.
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proceeding against the United States under NAFTA.2 6  The Clinton
administration asserted that when the problems associated with U.S. safety
concerns were resolved, the NAFTA provisions could be implemented.
27
Ill.
THE 2001 NAFTA ARBITRATION DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH
Between 1995 and 2001, Mexico enjoyed only limited access to the U.S.
trucking market. In turn, Mexico closed its border to U.S. trucks pending the
outcome of its arbitration proceeding against the United States. 28  In the
proceeding, Mexico claimed that the United States had breached its obligations
under NAFTA to phase out restrictions on cross-border trucking by the requisite
deadlines as prescribed in Annex 1.29 Specifically, Mexico alleged that the
United States had violated Articles 1202 (the National Treatment Clause) and
1203 (the Most Favored Nation Clause) by preventing Mexican trucking firms
from operating within the United States while giving Canadian trucking firms
unfettered access to U.S. roadways. 30 According to the arbitration panel:
The objectives of this Agreement [NAFTA], as elaborated more specifically
through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation
treatment and transparency, are to (a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate
the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the
Parties; and (b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area. 31
U.S. restrictions on Mexican trucking allegedly violated these principles and
rules.
The U.S. government claimed that its delayed compliance with Annex 1
was due to safety, homeland security, and economic concems. 32 The crux of its
argument was that Mexican trucks and drivers could not comply with certain
U.S. safety regulations governing hours-of-service limits, truck condition
standards, and alcohol and drug testing requirements. 33 However, concern was
pervasive in Washington that opening the border to Mexican trucking would
26. Mexico initially requested consultations with the United States as required under NAFTA
Article 2006 at a meeting with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission pursuant to NAFTA Article
2007. After these consultations failed, Mexico requested an arbitration panel to hear the dispute.
27. Sanger, supra note 24.
28. U.S.-Mexico Panel Decision, supra note 5, 22.
29. Id. 2.
30. Id. 3.
31. Id. 217.
32. Paul Blustein, U.S. Seeks Compromise on NAFTA Truck Rules; Mexican Border Travel
Raises Safety Concerns, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1995.
33. US-Mexico Panel Decision, supra note 5, 91, 95. Mexican trucks often fail to meet
safety standards and their drivers often work more hours than those set for American drivers.
Moreover, many trucks carry hazardous materials, including pesticides, corrosive chemicals, toxic
waste, fuel and other flammable substances.
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permit the transport of illegal or dangerous materials, including drugs and arms,
into the United States, and result in lost jobs and depressed wages for U.S.
workers. 34 Mexico claimed that United States' concern for Mexican safety
regulations was a red herring, and the U.S. government was simply bowing to
internal political pressure from labor unions.
35
In defense of its decision to allow Canadian trucking firms into the United
States, the U.S. government claimed that Canadian safety standards were
"equivalent" to that of the United States.36 Moreover, the United States took the
position that its policy in regard to Canada could not be in violation of NAFTA
because Canada's regulatory system for trucks - as opposed to Mexico's - is "in
like circumstances" with that of the United States, in compliance with NAFTA's
National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation clauses.3
7
On February 6, 2001, the NAFTA arbitration panel ruled in favor of
Mexico, stating that the failure of the United States to comply with Annex 1
violated NAFTA.3 8  In its opinion, the panel concluded that the U.S.
interpretation of the phrase "in like circumstances" under Articles 1202 and
1203 was too broad and thus frustrated NAFTA's objectives. 39 According to
the panel, the United States was permitted to impose different regulatory
requirements on Mexican truckers than Canadian truckers.40 The United States
needed to make that decision, however, "in good faith with respect to a
legitimate safety concern" and implement it in a way that fully conforms with
NAFTA.4 1 The panel recommended that the United States take all "appropriate
steps" to bring its cross-border trucking practices into compliance with
NAFTA.4 2 If it refused to do so, NAFTA Article 2019 permits Mexico to
impose sanctions against the United States.4 3
34. 1d.
35. Id. 7 6, 149.
36. Id. 7.
37. Id. 242.
38. US-Mexico Panel Decision, supra note 5, 295.
39. Id. 259.
40. Id. 301.
41. Id.
42. Id. 299.
43. Article 2019 provides:
Such complaining party may suspend the application to the Party complained against
of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as they have reached agreement on a
resolution of the dispute...
2. In considering what benefits to suspend pursuant to paragraph 1:
(a) a complaining Party should first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or
sectors as that affected by the measure or other matter that the panel has found to be
inconsistent with the obligations of this Agreement or to have caused nullification or
impairment in the sense of Annex 2004; and
(b) a complaining Party that considers it is not practicable or effective to suspend
20101
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Though the panel decided in Mexico's favor, it also specified that the
United States had the right to standardize safety regulations for those operating
motor vehicles within its borders. According to the panel, "[i]t is not making a
determination that the Parties to NAFTA may not set the level of protection that
they consider appropriate in pursuit of legitimate regulatory objectives." 44
Thus, although the United States could not deny Mexican trucking companies
the right to apply for cross-border trucking permits, it could regulate the safety
standards imposed upon Mexican trucking firms pursuant to NAFTA Article
1210. Article 1210 provides that such measures (a) are based on objective and
transparent criteria, (b) are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the
quality of a service, and (c) do not constitute a disguised restriction on the cross-
border provision of a service. 45 The panel's decision was a major victory for
NAFTA's weakest member, but it could not guarantee that the United States
would comply with the ruling in an expeditious manner.
The Bush administration initially vowed to comply with the panel's ruling
stating that "[W]e intend to live up to our NAFTA obligations to open the U.S. -
Mexico border to trucking [and] [d]iscussions are under way on how to
implement the recent NAFTA panel decision in a safe and orderly fashion." 46
Over the next several years, however, Congress pursued a policy of
"constructive delay" with Mexico to avoid having to comply with its NAFTA
Annex 1 obligations. In May 2001, Congress adopted more restrictive
legislation requiring that each Mexican carrier seeking to operate within the
commercial zones certify that its drivers have the requisite qualifications and
insurance levels, and that they comply with U.S. hours-of-service limits, truck
condition standards, and alcohol and drug testing requirements. 4 7  The law
further mandated upgrades in emissions controls and called for a greater number
of inspectors to monitor Mexican trucks at the border. 48 Mexican trucking firms
that satisfied the tough new requirements would receive temporary permits
benefits in the same sector or sectors may suspend benefits in other sectors.
NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 2019; see also Blackmore, supra note 22, at 721.
44. U.S.-Mexico Panel Decision, supra note 5, 298.
45. NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 1210.
46. Remarks by Undersecretary Alan Iarson Before the 54th Mexico-U.S. Business
Community, Outlining the Potential for Expanded U.S.-Mexico Trade, Mar. 7, 2001, available at
http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=indO 103a&L=dossdo&P=833.
47. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-87, 115 Stat. 833 (2001). The legislation requires Mexican drivers to have the equivalent of
a U.S. commercial driver's license, and to prevent fatigue, they will be required to maintain hours-
of-service logs showing that they are well-rested. See Hale Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking
Dispute: Pretexts for Non-Compliance and Policy Justifications for US. facilitation of Cross-Border
Services, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 235, 241 (2002).
48. Under the legislation, the number of truck inspectors on the border was increased from 58
to 274. Steven Greenhouse, Mexican Trucks Allowed to Haul All Over the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
28, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/l 1/28/us/mexican-trucks-allowed-to-haul-all-
over-us.html?page wanted= 1.
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subject to reevaluation within eighteen months.49 President Bush signed the
legislation.
In 2002, some progress was made in U.S.-Mexico trucking relations when
President Bush signed legislation easing the twenty-year moratorium on
Mexican trucking activity beyond the designated commercial zones.5 ° Under
the new policy, Mexican truckers and buses hauling cargo and passengers,
respectively, could drive throughout the United States after entering the country
at one of twenty-seven possible check points along the border. 5 1 The policy still
required that Mexican trucks and drivers comply with U.S. safety standards and
refused to allow Mexican trucks to provide service between points in the United
States.52 Nevertheless, it prompted the review and approval of more than a
hundred applications from Mexican trucking companies that were seeking to
haul freight in the United States.
53
In response to the new legislation, a coalition of labor, consumer and
environmental groups filed suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit seeking to enjoin the new policy on the basis that it violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act.54 The lawsuit
claimed that the new rules failed to require an examination of the air quality and
health effects of increased emissions and congestion from open-border trucking,
and, therefore, were not in compliance with federal law.55 The Ninth Circuit
ordered the Bush administration to conduct a full environmental review before
opening the border. 56 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit
a year later, ruling that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) did not have to perform a detailed environmental impact study
because the agency's issuance of regulations was not a legally relevant cause of
the environmental effect.57
The lawsuit and the 2004 presidential election campaign ultimately forced
the Bush administration to rethink its position on expanding cross-border access
to Mexican trucks. Hence, the administration and the Mexican government
resumed negotiations to develop an acceptable, long-term framework for cross-
border trucking. 58
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
55. Id. at 1024.
56. See id. at 1032; Court Blocks Bush Implementation of NAFTA Truck Panel, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 24, 2003, http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/display.asp?dn-INSIDETRADE-21-4-
16&f-wto200 l.ask.
57. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).
58. In 2005, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a report stating that the FMCSA
2010]
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IV.
THE 2007 CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING DEMONSTRATION (PILOT) PROGRAM
A. The Push to Comply with NAFTA Annex I
In February 2007, the Bush administration inched closer to complying with
NAFTA Annex 1 when it announced a Cross-Border Trucking Demonstration
(Pilot) Program with Mexico. 59 The pilot program allowed 100 Mexican trucks
to haul non-hazardous international cargo throughout the United States for one
year as long as the truck drivers were properly licensed, insured and could speak
and read English. 60 The purpose of the program was to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the safety programs adopted by Mexico-domiciled motor
carriers and the monitoring and enforcement systems developed by the U.S.
Department of Transportation. 6 1  In return for granting market access to a
limited number of Mexican trucks, Mexico agreed to grant 100 U.S.-domiciled
trucks access to its roadways for the same one-year period. "This program,"
announced Transportation Secretary Mary E. Peters, "will make trade with
Mexico easier and keep our roads safe at the same time."
62
The FMCSA initiated the demonstration project on September 6, 2007 for
one year, and later extended the project for two additional years on August 6,
2008.63 The pilot program came under attack from organized labor,
environmental groups and Democrats in Congress. The Teamsters, the Sierra
Club, and other organizations criticized the Bush administration for opening the
door to "serious safety, environmental, smuggling and security concerns."
64
cannot "grant long-haul operating authority to any Mexican motor carrier" until an agreement
"related to on-site safety reviews is reached with Mexico." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN, U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP, OIG REP. No. MH-2005-032, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT'S CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING PROVISIONS (2005). By
2007, the United States and Mexico were still negotiating over safety inspection procedures.
59. In response to the Bush Administration's announcement, Congress passed the U.S. Troop
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007) [hereinafter Pilot Program]. In that 2007 Act, Congress
specifically addressed the limited circumstances under which FMCSA would be permitted to grant
operating authority to Mexico-domiciled trucks to operate beyond the border zone. Most
significantly, a grant of authority must be "first tested as part of a pilot program." Id. §6901(a)(1).
60. Associated Press, supra note 1. Under the program, freight can move directly from origin
to destination beyond the 20 mile commercial zones along the border. Inspectors are permitted to
examine the condition of the trucks, interview drivers to ensure that they have a valid commercial
license and can read and speak English, and verify that their employers are insured by companies
licensed in the United States. Id.
61. Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 46263, 46264 (Aug. 17, 2007).
62. Associated Press, supra note 1.
63. John Fritelli, North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation: The Future
of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 1, 2010,
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/keyworkplace/703.
64. Gretel C. Kovach, For Mexican Trucks, a Road Into the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007,
[Vol. 28:2
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Teamsters president James T. Hoffa said that the administration was "playing a
game of Russian roulette on America's highways."
65
On Capitol Hill, the most vocal critic of the pilot program was Senator
Byron L. Dorgan (D-North Dakota). In 2008, he led the charge to insert a
provision into the fiscal year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Bill to kill the pilot
program. 66 Dorgan's crusade against the program threatened to drive a wedge
between the more moderate, pro-business wing of the Democratic party and
organized labor during the waning days of the 2008 presidential election
campaign. Foreshadowing what was ahead under a new Democratic
administration, Dorgan argued that "[b]oth President-elect Obama and Vice-
President-elect Biden voted to end the program in 2007, and it is expected that
the new administration will uphold the intent of Congress and shut down the
program in 2009. "67
In February 2009, the FMCSA released a report evaluating the pilot
program's effectiveness. 68 In general, the report concluded that the FMCSA
had taken the required steps to ensure the program's safe implementation and its
compliance with the new safety measures imposed by Congress. 69 The report
also showed that Mexican carriers participating in the program had no reportable
crashes and collectively had out-of-service rates lower than U.S. carriers.
70
Moreover, the report stated that the Mexican drivers participating in the program
had safety performance scores comparable to or better than American drivers,
partially undermining the argument set forth by organized labor that U.S.
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/O9/us/09truck.html.
65. Associated Press, supra note 1. The Teamsters, in particular, have led the charge against
the Pilot Program over the past two years. As discussed by one legal scholar, the focus of their
attack is two-pronged: (1) safety and (2) national security. In regard to safety, the Teamsters allege
that Mexican trucks seriously threaten America's roadways and the U.S. citizens who drive on them.
Mexican trucks, they contend, are old, unreliable and dangerous to those sharing the road. With
respect to national security, they argue that the contents of Mexican trucks often contain illicit drugs
as well as illegal and dangerous materials. Moreover, they contend that American economic security
is at risk as Mexican truck drivers steal jobs and depress wages. See Erica Richman, Comment, The
NAFTA Trucking Provisions and the Teamsters: Why They Need Each Other, 29 NW. J. INT'L LAW
& Bus. 555, 557-58 (2009).
66. Despite Congressional efforts to cut funding for the pilot program, the Bush
Administration was able to find funding for the program from other parts of the transportation
budget. See Associated Press, U.S. Moves Ahead with Mexican Truck Program, MSNBC.COM, Jan.
4, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22507319.
67. Ari Natter, Senator Dorgan Sees End for Cross Border Program, TRAFFIC WORLD
ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2008, available at www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2143264.
68. OFFICE OF LNSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRA.NSP., OIG REP. NO. MH-2009-034,
STATUS REPORT ON NAFTA CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT (2009),
available at http:llwww.oig.dot.gov/sites/dotfileslpdfdocs/NAFTA-finalreport-signed.pdf.
69. Id.
70. During the first year of the pilot program, Mexican carriers had a driver out-of-service rate
of 0.46 percent and a vehicle out-of-service rate of 8.29 percent. In contrast, U.S. carriers had a
driver out-of-service rate of 6.94 percent and a vehicle out-of-service rate of 21.72 percent. Id. at 4.
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restrictions on Mexican trucking are based on legitimate safety concerns.7 1 This
conclusion is tempered by the fact that that Mexican carrier participation during
the first year of the pilot project was too low to make accurate statistical
projections. 72 As such, disagreement persists about whether there is a safety
and performance differential between Mexican and U.S. truckers.
B. Obama's First Trade War
Strategic ambiguity is one way to describe the Obama administration's
position on NAFTA and the cross-border trucking dispute. 73 Upon taking office
in January 2009, President Obama softened his tough rhetoric on free trade,
warning repeatedly against tit-for-tat protectionism in the midst of an economic
crisis. However, in March 2009, he signed the FY 2009 Omnibus Spending Bill
into law, which cut off funding for the pilot program that allows Mexican long-
haul trucks to deliver goods into the United States. 74 According to the White
House, President Obama wanted to create a new trucking project that would
meet the "legitimate concerns" of Congress as well as U.S. commitments under
NAFTA. 75 The Obama administration asked the U.S. Trade Representative's
office to work with Congress, the Department of Transportation, and the State
Department to accomplish this task.
76
In response to the suspension of the pilot program, Mexican officials
pursued an aggressive strategy against the United States. The Mexican
government, acting under NAFTA Article 2019, imposed $2.4 billion in import
duties ranging from 10 to 45 percent on 90 products from the United States. 77
According to Mexico's Economy Secretary Gerardo Ruiz Mateos, "the
retaliatory measures are the cost the United States is going to have to pay for
failing to fulfill its obligations under NAFTA. '" 78 More specifically, Mexico
71. See id. at 15-16.
72. The report concluded that project participation was too low to make statistical projections
given the fact that other Mexican carriers are likely to seek long-haul authority in the future. Id at
15.
73. See Obama and Trade: Low Expectations Exceeded, THE ECONOMIST, May 2, 2009, at 73.
74. Id; see also Mark Stevenson, Mexico Imposes Tariffs on U.S. Goods, WASH. POST, Mar.
17, 2009, at D06, available at http://www. was hingto npost.com/wp -
dyn/content/article/2009/03/16/AR2009031602901.html; loan Grillo, Obama's Trade War: No
Truck with Mexico, TIME, Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887494,00.html.
75. Associated Press, Obama to Revisit Restrictions on Access of Mexican Trucks, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.connews/2009/mar1 2/mexico-
truck-ban-to-get-new-look.
76. Id.
77. Grillo, supra note 74.
78. Mark Stevenson, Mexico Retaliates with Tariffs on 90 U.S. Products, USA TODAY, Mar.
16, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/worldflatinmmerica/2009-03-16-
3456830028_x.htm.
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opted to cross-retaliate against the United States pursuant to Article 2019(2) (b).
Under this provision, Mexico has imposed rotating tariff hikes on a cross-section
of goods in order to affect the greatest potential impact on U.S. trade and
production. The typical sanctions approach under NAFTA is for the injured
state to impose fixed countermeasures on a limited number of products or
services in the same sector as that in which the harm has occurred. Here, the
strategy is to apply pressure on industry groups, other than trucking services, in
key states to mobilize political pressure on the Obama administration to alter its
policy. This cross-sector approach is unprecedented under NAFTA.
The suspension of the pilot program also triggered a negative response
from Mexico's private trucking industry. Mexico's National Cargo
Transportation Association (CANACAR) - a private trade group representing
4500 trucking companies - filed a lawsuit under NAFTA seeking $6 billion in
compensation for losses they allegedly have suffered since the U.S. government
first imposed restrictions on Mexican trucks. 79 According to CANACAR's
attorney, Pedro Ojeda, the lawsuit's purpose was to "demand equal treatment
and reciprocity because our industry is suffering." 80 CANACAR's request for
compensation is the largest made by a private actor against a state party in
NAFTA's history.
81
Mexico's actions fueled criticism of the White House among various
industry and consumer groups, whose economic interests are threatened by the
imposition of Mexican tariffs. Mexico is the third largest trading partner of the
United States after Canada and China, and the new tariffs potentially jeopardize
over 12,000 agricultural and 14,000 manufacturing jobs. 82 In a joint letter to
President Obama, General Electric, Wal-Mart, and 148 other businesses warned
that "retaliation is already impacting the ability of a broad range of U.S. goods
to compete in the Mexican market, from potatoes and sunscreen to paper and
dishwashers." 83 They called for the White House to take immediate action to
resolve the trade dispute with Mexico.
79. See Associated Press, Mexican Truckers Sue U.S. Government Over Ban, ABC NEWS,
June 1, 2009, http:#/abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7740307. See also Jose de
Cordoba, Mexican Truckers File $6 Billion Claim Against U.S. in NAFTA Spat, WALL ST. JOURNAL,
June 2, 2009, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124390544386374905.html.
80. Associated Press, supra note 79.
81. Cordoba, supra note 79.
82. See Doug Palmer, LaHood Sends Obama Advice on Ending Trucking Dispute, REUTERS,
Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53C68F20090414. In 2008, the United
States and Mexico had $368 billion in total trade. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: Top
Trading Partners, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/index.html#2009 (last visited March 19,
2010); see also Obama Pressured to Let Mexican Truckers Through, THE FARMER-STOCKMAN Apr.
8, 2009, available at http://the farmer-
stockman.com/story.aspxlobama/pressured/to/let/mexican/truckers/through/8/22825.
83. William Booth & Scott Wilson, Obama Prepares for Mexico Talks on Drug Trade, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 2009, at A06, available at http://ivww.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contcnt/article/2009/04/14/AR2009041403224.html.
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For the Obama administration, safety is a major concern in the trucking
dispute. 84 Reports show that Mexican drivers drive old, unreliable trucks, work
extremely long hours, and endure fatigue in order to keep their jobs.85 This
results in preventable highway deaths in border areas where underpaid,
overworked drivers are concentrated. Mexico's ambassador to the United
States, Arturo Sarukhan, contends that ending the program has nothing to do
with safety, but is rather a protectionist move. 86 U.S. Transportation Secretary
Ray LaHood has been working with members of Congress, industry officials
and union representatives to craft a new program that would satisfy safety
concerns and reopen U.S. roads to Mexican trucks. 87 The dispute has been
dubbed "Obama's first trade war."
V.
THE RETALIATION REMEDY AS A TOOL TO AvOID TRADE WARS
A. Theory and Purpose of Retaliation
Since the end of World War II, the retaliation remedy has proved to be one
of the more successful tools to promote state compliance with international trade
rules. Retaliation involves the authorized suspension of concessions or other
obligations by one party against another in a trade dispute; usually in the form of
a complaining party imposing, or threatening to impose, higher tariff rates on a
list of exports from the offending party to induce the latter to remove an illegal
measure. The theory behind retaliation is rooted in the principle of reciprocity
and self-interest, whereby an injured party is permitted to seize the offensive in a
trade dispute by imposing countermeasures against the offending state. 88 The
goal is to compel compliance with trade rules by imposing costs on export
groups who can bring maximum pressure to bear upon political leaders to
84. Nicholas Johnston & Jens Erik Gould, Obama Promises Solution to U.S. - Mexico
Trucking Spat, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ne ws?pid=20601070&sid=aiVLrrhUWbiU.
85. Long-haul truck drivers who bring freight to the shipping terminals at the U.S. border
describe their runs as "working on the blade of a knife" because of the dangers of Mexican
highways. See Jesse Katz, Working on the Blade of a Knife, LA TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-18/news/mn-48410_1_el-reverendo.
86. Dana Gabriel, Ending NAFTA Inspired Trucking Program Could Spark Retaliation,
BORDERFIRE REPORT, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.borderfirereport.net/dana-
gabriel/ending-nafta-inspired-trucking-program-could-spark-retaliation.php.
87. Cordoba, supra note 79. See also Lois Romano, Voices of Power: Interview of Ray
LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2009, available at
http:llwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/24/AR2009042401623.html.
88. See Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the
World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 215
(2005); Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA
L REV. 1, 4 (2003).
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remedy the violation. Faced with higher tariffs, exporters are forced to lobby
their government for the removal of the offending measure that led to the
retaliation in the first place.
The effectiveness of retaliation usually depends upon a variety of factors:
the amount of harm caused by the offense; the discrepancy in strength between
the injured and offending parties' economies; and the degree of influence
injured import groups have with the complaining government and targeted
export groups have with the offending government. In trade disputes between
large countries, the threat of retaliation in the same sector usually creates
sufficient anxiety among targeted export groups to trigger a lobbying effort to
remove the illegal restriction. At the same time, the injured state runs the risk of
igniting a trade war should countermeasures provoke a hostile reaction within
the offending state. Through the lens of game theory analysis, political leaders
on both sides of a dispute must weigh the costs and benefits of retaliation before
going down this road.
To mitigate the possibility of a trade war, there are strict guidelines for
retaliation contained within the rules and procedures governing the settlement of
disputes before the World Trade Organization (WTO) and NAFTA.8 9 For
instance, under both WTO and NAFTA rules, only a complaining party who has
been injured can retaliate against the offending party.90 This rule excludes
Canada from being able to impose countermeasures against the United States for
violating NAFTA's trucking regulations in the U.S.-Mexico cross-border
trucking dispute. Moreover, countermeasures, if authorized, must be
"equivalent" to the injury caused by the illegal measure and "related to" the
same economic sector as the illegal measure. 9 1 For example, if State X violates
a trade commitment to State Y by raising tariffs on $20 million worth of widgets
(goods) from State Y, State Y may seek a judgment and authorization from a
dispute settlement panel to impose approximately $20 million of retaliatory
tariffs in the same sector (goods) against State X. This form of retaliation -
same-sector retaliation - is the most frequently used remedy to resolve trade
disputes.92
The procedure for implementing a WTO or NAFTA panel ruling is fairly
straight-forward. Once a dispute is decided, the offending party has three
options. First, it can ignore the ruling. Second, it can remove the offending
89. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dsu-e.htm [hereinafter DSU]. See also General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 LLM. 1125, 1126 [hereinafter
GATT]; see also NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 2019.
90. GATT, supra note 89, art. 22; see also NAFTA,supra note 14, art. 2019.
91. GATT, supra note 89, art. 22; see also NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 2019.
92. R.V. Anuradha, WTO Gamble on Market Rights, WSV, LIvEMINr.com, Feb. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.livemint.corn/2008/02/12001523/WTO-gamble-on-market-rights.html.
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restriction. Third, it can continue the violation while compensating the
complainant. 93 If the offending party chooses the first option, the injured party
may request enforcement authority - i.e., countermeasures. Typically, once
countermeasures have been authorized, the injured state announces a list of
potential products to be targeted from the offending state. The goal of
retaliation is not to make the injured party whole, but to induce the offending
party to remove the offending measure.
94
During the past fifteen years, hundreds of trade disputes have been lodged
with the WTO and NAFTA but only a few have reached the stage of authorized
retaliation. 95 Generally, an offending party will withdraw, or modify, the
restrictive measure before the dispute reaches this final stage. A major reason
for the high level of compliance has been the heavy-handed nature of the
retaliation remedy. The mere threat of retaliation by the injured state forces the
offending government to consider the interests of those targeted by the
retaliation and the political costs associated with both compliance and
noncompliance. In most cases, the offending state will remove the restrictive
measure aimed at protecting certain import groups if the cost of maintaining the
measure will be felt by domestic export interests.
One of the most notable cases involving "same-sector" retaliation was the
WTO dispute between the European Union (EU) and the United States over the
U.S. imposition of steel tariffs in 2002. At the time, the U.S. steel industry had
been lobbying the Bush administration for an increase in steel tariffs to protect it
from foreign competition and provide it time to restructure its domestic
operations. Hoping to shore up support in steel producing swing states such as
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, the Bush administration announced
tariffs up to 30 percent on imported steel for three years. 96 The EU, Japan,
Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, and Brazil filed actions with
the WTO seeking the removal of the tariffs on various legal grounds, including
violations of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX: 1 of GATT 1994.97
93. NAFTA Chapter H deals with investment disputes between the members. Article 1110
provides compensation as a remedy to expropriation. NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 1110.
94. Alexander, supra note 3, at 487.
95. See generally Alexander, supra note 3.
96. The U.S. imposed 30% tariffs on most flat-rolled steel products and 15% tariffs on rebar
and stainless steel. See Presidential Proclamation No. 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 7, 2002); see
also Bush Slaps Tariffs on Steel, THE VICTORIAN ADVOCATE, Mar. 6 2002,16A. President Bush had
followed the International Trade Commission's recommendation from 2001 to impose significant
tariffs of between 20% and 40% on 17 steel products for three years in order to remedy the steel
crisis in the US. M. Gyorffi, European Parliament: Common Policies, Steel Industry (Sept. 2006),
available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&id=74&ftuld=FTU_4.
8.2.html. Under WTO rules, countries can impose temporary increases in tariffs, known as
safeguards, to give time for a domestic industry to restructure to improve competitiveness.
97. Summary of Dispute, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop eldispu-e/cases-e/ds248_e.htm
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On July 11, 2003, a WTO panel found that the U.S. safeguard measures at
issue were inconsistent with WTO rules and requested the U.S. to bring its
measures into conformity with its obligations under the agreement. 98 On
appeal, the WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision and the EU
threatened to retaliate if the United States did not comply with its WTO
obligations by December 5, 2003. 99 The EU had drawn up a list of U.S.
products targeted with higher import duties and submitted that list to the White
House. 100 The day before the deadline arrived, the United States withdrew the
tariffs. 10 1
The EU's carefilly targeted sanctions approach was the main reason the
Bush administration decided to withdraw the steel tariffs. Rather than hit a wide
range of products, the EU had focused on a discrete set of industry groups from
political swing states who could potentially mobilize quickly during an election
year. 10 2 For example, the EU list included 100% tariffs on fruit juices from
Florida, t-shirts from South Carolina, and apples from Washington, all of which
were critical swing states during the 2004 presidential election.10 3 The EU's
objective was to mobilize specific export groups to lobby the Bush
administration for the removal of the steel tariffs. 10 4 The Bush administration
capitulated because the political cost of losing support in these states one year
before the presidential election was far greater than maintaining the restrictive
measures on behalf of the steel industry. Though retaliation had never been
authorized in this case, the EU's mere threat to seek that authorization and
impose sanctions proved just as effective.
[hereinafter Steel Dispute Summary] (last updated Feb. 24, 2010).
98. Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products - Final Reports of the Panel, WT/DS248/R (July 11, 2003).
99. Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products - AB-203-3 - Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10,
2003). The EU threatened to retaliate against $2.2 billion worth of U.S. goods unless the U.S.
withdrew the steel tariffs by 5 December 2003. See Joel Roberts, Bush Drops Steel Tariffs: U.S.
Steelmakers Denounce Move; EU Ends Threat of Sanctions, CBSNEWS.COM, Dec. 4, 2003,
available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/l2/04/politics/main586980.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;4.
100. As a response to the US tariffs, a Resolution of the ECSC Consultative Committee was
adopted unanimously in April 2002. The Consultative Committee, whilst recognizing that the US
steel industry is faced with economic, social and regional problems, firmly contested that these
problems were caused by imports. Council Regulation (EC) No 1031/2002 established additional
customs duties on imports of certain products originating in the U.S. Additional duties of 100%
were imposed on certain products such as dried vegetables, fruits, juices and clothing. Gyorffi,
supra note 96.
101. See Steel Dispute Summary, supra note 97.
102. See Council Regulation 1031/2002 of 13 June 2002 Establishing Additional Customs
Duties on Imports of Certain Products Originating in the United States of America, 2002 O.J. (L
157) 8.
103. Id
104. See Roberts, supra note 99.
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The effectiveness of the retaliation remedy in the U.S.-EU steel dispute can
be attributed to the role that domestic interest groups play in the political
process. Business- conflict theorists argue that the most important domestic
groups affecting government policy in the trade realm are multinational
corporations who tend to be outward-looking/export-oriented in nature. 10 5 The
goal of retaliation is for the injured state to inflict sufficient harm on the
offending state's key export groups so that they, in turn, will pressure their
government to remove the offending restriction supported by import-oriented
groups. This is precisely what the EU did to compel U.S. compliance with
WTO rules in the steel dispute. By strategically targeting products in politically
sensitive states, the EU was able to create pressure on the Bush administration to
change its policy. But what if the injured state is much weaker than the
offending state, and, therefore, incapable of effectively imposing same-sector
retaliatory tariffs to bring about a change in policy?
B. Cross-Sector Retaliation as an Alternative Remedy
A criticism of the current dispute settlement system under the WTO is that
"same-sector retaliation" is less effective in resolving asymmetric disputes
between unequal states - the classic case of David v. Goliath. 106 According to
the argument, compliance is less likely to occur if an injured state cannot bring
105. For perspectives on business conflict or interest group models, see generally HELEN
MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1998); Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Realist Environment, Liberal Process and Domestic-Level
Variables, 41 INT'I. STUD. Q. 1 (1997); ROBERT BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S.
IMPORT POLICY (1996); David Skidmore, The Business ofInternational Politics, 39 MERSHO STUD.
REV. 246 (1995).
106. Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton point out that developing countries are at a
disadvantage in the WTO dispute settlement system because they cannot afford the cost of complex
legal proceedings and are less likely to be able to impose 100 percent ad valorem tariffs, or other
countermeasures, on products from from a large offending state. JOSEPH STIGLITZ & ANDREW
CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: How TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 84 (2005); see also
Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and Preferences: Developing Countries and the
Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 515, 526-27 (2005); Douglas
lerley, Defining the Factors That Influence Developing Country Compliance and Participation in
the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the Dispute Over Bananas, 33 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L. BUS. 615, 616-17 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J.
INT'L. L 792, 792, 832 (2001); Benjamin L Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World
Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance
from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 134 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn,
Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules - Toward a More Collective
Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L 335, 338 (2000); Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L. BUS. 709, 712-13, 729 (2000); Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO Understanding
on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1223,
1226 (1999); Kofi Oteng Kufuor, From GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the
Reform Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117,
132-40 (1997).
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sufficient pressure to bear on key export groups in the same sector to effectuate
a change in policy. Thus, to promote compliance, the injured state should be
allowed to engage in cross-sector sector retaliation if particular export-oriented
groups in another sector are better able to persuade their government to remove
an offending restriction. Cross-sector retaliation helps to level the playing field
between large and small states by giving small complainants the flexibility to
apply pressure in areas that might inflict more harm on a large state, thus
improving the chances of compliance. 107 Today, there is a growing list of cross-
sector retaliation cases in international economic relations, the latest being
Mexico's decision to employ this remedy against the United States in the cross-
border trucking dispute.
1. The Bananas Case (Ecuador v. EU)
The EU Banana Import Regime was the first test case for cross-sector
retaliation. The EU had been discriminating against banana imports from
Central America while providing ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the
Pacific with preferential access to EU markets for their banana exports. 10 8 In
1996, the United States, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico filed a joint
complaint in the WTO challenging the legality of the EU banana import
policy.10 9 A dispute settlement panel and the WTO Appellate Body ruled that
the EU banana regime violated WTO rules and ordered the EU to modify the
regime or face retaliation from the complainants."10 Following a stand-off
between the parties, the WTO eventually authorized the United States and
Ecuador to impose retaliatory tariffs against EU products in the amount of
$191.4 million and $201.6 million per year, respectively. 1
Following the ruling, Ecuador requested authorization to suspend trade
concessions in different sectors of the EU economy, including goods, services,
and intellectual property. 112 This was the first time that a developing country
had requested cross-sector retaliation as a remedy under the WTO dispute
107. Alexander, supra note 3, at 506-07.
108. The EU's tariff quota system granted selected import licenses to preferred former colonies
in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific ("ACP countries") and restricted imports of bananas from
Central America. U.S. banana distributors, such as Chiquita Brands International, Inc., lobbied for
the removal of the quota system following a loss of profits resulting from the exclusion of Central
American bananas from the EU market.
109. Summary of Dispute, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop E/dispue/cases-e/ds27_e.htm [hereinafter Bananas Dispute]
(last updated Feb. 24, 2010).
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. In November of 1999, Ecuador requested authorization to retaliate against the EU in the
amount of S450 million per year. Frances Williams, Ecuador seeks to retaliate in banana dispute,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, at 7.
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settlement system. 113 As the world's largest producer of bananas, Ecuador was
the injured party most affected by the EU's discriminatory import policy. The
WTO agreed with Ecuador's position that the EU policy violated both the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO Agreement on
Import Licensing. 114
In an unprecedented decision, the arbitrators granted Ecuador the right to
cross-retaliate against $201.6 million in EU goods, services, and intellectual
property per year pursuant to the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs). 115 The decision acknowledged the fact that Ecuador
was a small trading partner of the EU, and therefore would be limited in its
capacity to obtain EU compliance through the imposition of tariffs in the goods
sector alone. For the EU, countermeasures in the service sector, where seven
out of ten Europeans are employed, were bound to stir up controversy. Thus, by
the time Ecuador and the U.S. had prepared their sanctions list, the EU had
agreed to reform its banana import regime. 116
The outcome in the Bananas case is inconsistent with the conventional
wisdom concerning the powerlessness of developing countries in asymmetric
trade disputes. The EU, faced with authorized sanctions in more than one
sector, agreed to reform its banana import policy rather than risk a backlash
from affected service sector export interests back home. Until the Bananas case,
weaker WTO members had been reluctant to request authorization to retaliate
against a more powerful member. These weaker members were concerned that
sanctions would have little impact or cause the stronger members to cut off aid
or suspend certain preferential trading arrangements. 117 By allowing Ecuador to
retaliate against the EU under GATS and TRIPs, the WTO granted this weaker
nation the means to effectively pressure the world's largest regional trade bloc to
comply with its WTO obligations.
The United States also acted on its authority to retaliate against the EU in
the Bananas case, imposing $191.4 million worth of sanctions on a variety of
EU products. 118 U.S. import duties were strategically targeted toward key
113. Id.
114. For dispute settlement panel report, see Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Complaint by Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May
22, 1997). For Appellate Body Report, see Appellate Body Report, European Communities -
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
115. Frances Williams & Edward Alden, Ecuador sanctions plea backed, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2000, at 2.
116. See Movsesian, supra note 88, at 15; see also The EU Banana Regime, text from the UK
Government Briefing (DEFRA) on Agriculture and Rural Development Committee, Nov. 30, 2001,
available at http://www.erylmcnallymep.orguk/eu banana-regime.htm.
117. See Liz Harper, Challenges for Poorer Nations at the WTO, online newsletter, Sept. 2003,
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/wto/case_study.html.
118. Id; see also Brimeyer, supra note 106, at 152-53.
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export groups who could bring maximum pressure to bear on Brussels to modify
the EU banana import regime. Under a newly enacted "carousel" provision, the
U.S. government imposed tariffs on a rotating basis against a discrete set of EU
industries every six months.1 19  One of these industries was the Scottish
cashmere industry. 120  Another targeted group was the Italian handbag
industry. 12 1 Eventually, the EU agreed to bring its banana import regime into
compliance with WTO rules. 122  Thus, the Bananas case illustrates the
effectiveness of the retaliation remedy and demonstrates how the strategic
targeting of countermeasures by an injured party against a cross-section of
interest groups can bring about compliance with the law.
2. The Online Gambling Dispute (Antigua v. US.)
Another example of cross-sector retaliation in an asymmetric dispute was
the online gambling case between the United States and Antigua. In 2003,
Antigua, with a population of 70,000 and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
under $1 billion, filed a WTO complaint' 23 against the United States over the
U.S. prohibition of foreign-based online casinos.124 Antigua alleged that the
United States violated its obligations under GATS by allowing domestic
companies to offer online gambling service to its own citizens while shutting its
border to overseas Internet gambling services. 125 In particular, the provisions at
issue were GATS Articles II, VI, VIII, XI, XVI, and XVII, as well as the U.S.
Schedule of Specific Commitments annexed to the GATS.
119. The Trade and Development Act of 2000 (the "Carousel Legislation Act") requires U.S.
trade officials to revise the list of products subject to retaliation periodically. Congress enacted it in
order to pressure foreign governments to remove offending trade measures and comply with WTO
rules. 2000 § 407(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2416(b)(2)(B) (2000).
120. See Press Release 99-17, U.S. Trade Representative, United States Takes Customs Actions
on European Imports (Mar. 3, 1999), available at www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/03/99-60.pdf.
121. See James Blitz & Frances Williams, Italians urge EU to retreat in bananas dispute with
the U.S., FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990, at 6; see also Nzilibe, supra note 88, at 226.
122. See Bananas Dispute, supra note 109.
123. Summary of Dispute, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Online Gambling Dispute].
The complaint was filed in the wake of the conviction of a U.S. citizen, Jay Cohen, who was
convicted and sentenced to jail for operating an online gambling website based in Antigua. United
States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
124. Off-shore gaming enterprises claim that their industry creates jobs for residents of poor
islands in the Caribbean, supposedly offsetting the negative effects of gambling addiction, tax
evasion and money laundering associated with the economies of the Caribbean. See Gene
Koprowski, U.S. Misses Deadline in Online Gaming Dispute with Antigua, CARIBBEAN NET NEWS,
Apr. 20, 2006, available at http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/cgi-
script/csArticles/articles/00001 3/001317.htm.
125. The United States allowed several domestic gambling companies to offer online gambling
to Americans (otherwise known as legal gaming operations) such as Native American casinos and
riverboat gambling. See Emily Flynn Vencat, The Caribbean Hold'Em, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/41719.
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The WTO found in favor of Antigua at both the panel and the appellate
levels. 12 6 First, it was determined that U.S. federal laws prohibiting online
gambling violated the "market access" rules in GATS Article XVI.12 7 Second,
the WTO found that the United States had not demonstrated that its laws were
applied consistently with the chapeau of Article XIV, which requires that
measures found necessary to protect public morals not be "applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
trade in services."' 128 The WTO ordered the United States to bring its laws into
conformity with the GATS or face the prospect of retaliatory sanctions. The
U.S. refused to do so mainly because Antigua did not possess the economic
muscle to impose meaningful sanctions against it in the same sector -
services. 129
The asymmetric nature of the U.S.-Antigua relationship prompted Antigua
to pursue cross-retaliation as a remedy to compel U.S. compliance with its WTO
obligations. On June 21, 2007, Antigua requested authorization from the WTO
to cross-retaliate against the United States pursuant to Article 22.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding. 130 Specifically, Antigua sought to suspend
its obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agreement on the basis that the United
States is one of the leading producers of pharmaceuticals, movies, music and
software technology. According to one Antiguan official, "selling legally
pirated copies of Microsoft software and Disney movies - would get the
attention of Hollywood and Silicon Valley." 13 1 The WTO agreed with Antigua
that it had no effective remedy against the United States in the area of services,
and therefore authorized Antigua to impose sanctions in the amount of $21
million under the TRIPS Agreement. 132 Antigua became known as the "Pirate
of the Caribbean," setting aside domestic rules aimed at protecting patented
products and copyrights produced by corporate giants like Eli Lilly and the
Motion Picture Association of America. 133 According to one of the lawyers
126. Online Gambling Dispute, supra note 123; see also Shamnad Basheer, Turning TRIPS on
Its Head: An "IP Cross Retaliation Model" Express 0 (2009), available at
http://works.bepress.com/shamnadbasheer/l/.
127. Online Gambling Dispute, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. In 2007, U.S. total GDP was $14.11 trillion and its per capita GDP was $46,800 compared
to Antigua's total GDP of $1.57 billion and per capita GDP of $18,900, respectively. Central
Intelligence Agency, AntigualBarbuda, WORLD FACT BOOK (2009), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geosac. html.
130. Online Gambling Dispute, supra note 123.
131. Vencat,supra note 125.
132. James Kanter & Gary Rivlin, In Trade Ruling, Antigua Wins a Right to Piracy, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/business/worldbusiness/22gambling.html?pagewanted=print.
133. Simon Lester, WTO Gambling Dispute: Antigua Mulls Retaliation as the US. Negotiates
Withdrawal of its GATS Commitments, 12 ASIL INSIGHTS, Issue 5, Apr. 8, 2008, available at
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representing Antigua, "[t]his is a landmark victory for Antigua as the first, and
smallest, WTO member to defeat the United States, the largest member, in this
well-respected international trade court." 134 The United States responded to the
decision by invoking GATS Article XXI to withdraw its commitments on
gambling services within the WTO framework. 135  The withdrawal of
commitments prompted protests and accusations of bad faith within the
WTO. 13 6
Though the United States failed to relax its laws restricting overseas-based
Internet gambling within its borders, the WTO decision was a significant victory
for developing countries. It showed that a more flexible application of the
retaliation remedy can give a smaller state power to strike back against a larger
state in an asymmetric dispute. In the words of one former senior U.S. trade
official, "[i]ntellectual property is the perfect sanction item because it gives
small countries like Antigua absolute leverage."' 137 Since the decision, the
Motion Picture Association of America has been pressuring the U.S. Trade
Representative to negotiate with Antigua to prevent bootlegging. 138 Moreover,
the United States has entered into settlement agreements with the EU, Australia,
Japan, Canada, India, Costa Rica, and Macau over its discriminatory online
gambling policy. 139 Thus, like the Bananas case, the WTO recognized the
imbalance of economic strength between the parties in the online gambling case
and allowed the injured party to cross-retaliate in an industry sector where the
larger state would feel the punch.
VI.
THE CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING DISPUTE AND STRATEGIC
CROSS-SECTOR RETALIATION UNDER NAFTA
The NAFTA provisions governing retaliation are similar to the WTO's
http://www.asil.org/insights080408.cfm; see generally, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the
Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 313 (2008).
134. U.S. and Antigua Dispute WTO Ruling, BBC NEws Apr. 7, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4422457.stm.
135. Under Article XXI, a Member may withdraw specific commitments, but must negotiate
with "affected Members" over "compensation" for the withdrawn commitments. This procedure has
only been invoked once before in a case involving EU GATS commitments in relation to EU
enlargement. See Lester, supra note 133.
136. See id.
137. Vencat, supra note 125.
138. Bob Hartman, Hollywood Urges US to Stop Internet Gambling Prohibition, CASINO
GAMBLING WEB, Sept. 16, 2007, available at http://www.casinogamblingweb.com/gambling-
news/gambling-law/hollywoodurges usto stopinternetgamblingprohibition_46939.html;
Vencat, supra note 125.
139. See Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND ECONOMICS, U.S Trade Comm., July 2009, available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/jourmals/onlinegambling dispute.pdf.
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provisions. NAFTA Article 2019(1) provides that a party "may suspend
benefits of equivalent effect until such time as [the parties] have reached
agreement on a resolution of the dispute." 140 In considering what benefits to
suspend, an injured party should first "seek to suspend benefits in the same
sector" as that affected by the restrictive measure. 14 1 If it is not practicable or
effective to suspend benefits in the same sector, the injured party "may suspend
benefits in other sectors." 142 The agreement further states that
[o]n the written request of any disputing Party delivered to the other Parties and
its Section of the Secretariat, the Commission shall establish a panel to determine
whether the level of benefits suspended by a Party pursuant to paragraph 1 is
manifestly excessive. 143
A. Mexico's Use of Strategic Cross-Sector Retaliation Against the United
States
Following the Obama administration's decision to suspend the 2007 pilot
program, Mexico announced that it planned to cross-retaliate against the United
States in the goods-sector alone to the tune of $2.4 billion. 144 Mexican officials
claim that the tariffs are only imposed on products that have been shipped under
the pilot program and hence fall within the same sector. 14 5 Some of the U.S.
product groups facing import duties of 10-20 percent include Christmas trees,
onions, pears, cherries potatoes, soy sauce, soup, mineral water, sunflower
seeds, strawberries, wine, shampoo, toothpaste, deodorants, notebooks, coffee
makers, sunglasses, almonds, beer, and batteries. 146 According to the U.S.
140. NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 2019(1).
141. Id. art. 2019(2)(a).
142. Id. art. 2019(2)(b).
143. Id. art. 2019(3).
144. Similar to the disparity in the size of the parties' economies in the U.S.-Antigua tnternet
gambling dispute, the asymmetric nature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship has prompted Mexico to
pursue cross-retaliation as a remedy to compel U.S. compliance with its NAFTA obligations. In
2007, Mexico's total GDP was $893 billion and its per capita GDP was $12,400. Central Intelligence
Agency, The United States, WORLD FACTBOOK (2009), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/printlus.html. Obama Criticized for
Mexico, Brazil Sanctions, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6283NR20100309; Ken Ellingwood, Mexico levies higher
tariffs on U.S. imports, LA TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/19/world/fg-mexico-tariffs19.
145. Fruits and vegetables are the most common items on the list of 90 products targeted with
tariffs.Thomas Black and Grayton Harrison, Mexico Puts Tariffs on US. Goods in Truck Dispute,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 18, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=aNMnPuyYFV5I&refer--canada.
146. Christopher Conkey, Jose de Cordoba & Jim Carlton, Mexico Issues Tariff List in U.S.
Trucking Dispute, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A7, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123739445919172781.htmi; see also United States Dept. of
Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Mexico Retaliation List (Mar. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/30lalert/mxret.htmt [hereinafter Mexico Retaliation List];
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Department of Commerce, the retaliatory tariffs "represent the lost income
roughly equal to the losses Mexican officials claim to have suffered with the end
of the demonstration program." 147 The Obama administration has repeatedly
urged Mexico to hold off on the new tariffs, but to no avail.
The selection of a limited group of U.S. products reflects a calculated move
by Mexican officials that this first round of retaliatory tariffs will spur U.S.
business leaders to lobby Congress to restart the trucking program.
14 8
Moreover, officials claim to have targeted only specific exports from states
whose political leaders have been opposed to the pilot program.149 The
selection of a limited group of U.S. products reflects a calculated move by the
Mexican government to exert pressure on powerful Democratic lawmakers in
key states who have influence with the White House.
In California, grape exporters have been hit under the Mexican Tariff List
with a 45 percent tariff hike, by far the highest. 150 Currently, there are more
than 550 grape producers based in California, and grape exports from this state
have increased 36 percent in the last ten years. 15 1 California is also home to
Senator Diane Feinstein, Senator Barbara Boxer and Speaker of the U.S. House
of Representatives Nancy Pelosi. These three lawmakers helped to push through
the FY 2009 omnibus spending measure, which cut funding for the pilot
program. 152 Additionally, every California Democrat in the U.S. House and
some House Republicans voted in favor of the omnibus spending bill. The
Mexican tariffs are aimed at causing damage to California's wine producers who
are now at a competitive disadvantage to other foreign producers for Mexican
market share. "If you are a California wine producer, and you're competing
against Chilean wine that's coming in duty free, you're screwed," said
University of Arizona professor James E. Rogers. "Clearly, this was designed to
bring about some specific pain."' 153
Diaro Oficial De La Federaciaon [D.O.], Tomo DCLXVI, No. 15, Mar. 18, 2009, p. 50-52 (in
Spanish)[hereinafter DIARO OFICIAL].
147. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, North American Free Trade Agreement: Mexico Cross-
Border Trucking Fact Sheet, available at http://www.uschamber.com/international/policy/nafta.htm.
148. Mexico has indicated that it might increase the number of products it has "slapped tariffs"
on if this first retaliatory round does not produce results. Conkey, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. Mexico Retaliation List, supra note 146.
151. Grapes from California, California Table Grape Commission, 2008, available at
http://www.freshcaliforniagrapes.com/overview.php; see also Fresh Plaza: Global Fresh Produce
and Banana News, International Promotions Increase California Grape Sales (Mar. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.freshplaza.com/news-detail.asp?id=40765.
152. Both Senators Feinstein and Boxer voted for the 2009 omnibus-spending bill, and Speaker
Pelosi had calendar authority to bring the bill to the House floor for a vote. See U.S. Senate Roll
Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session, United States Senate, Mar. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.senate. gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfmrcfm?congress= II &session
=l&vote=00096 [hereinafter Senate Roll Call Vote].
153. Brian J. Pedersen, Mexican Tariffs Hit Southern Arizona Exporters, ARIZ. DAILY STAR,
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The state of Oregon, too, has been hit with Mexican import duties on a
large scale. In 2008, Mexican consumers purchased approximately $748 million
worth of goods from Oregon. 154 Mexico has targeted Oregon Christmas trees,
pears, frozen potatoes, and cherries with 20 percent tariff hikes. It has also
imposed a 10 percent levy on onions from the state. 155 U.S. Senators Jeff
Merkey (D-Oregon) and Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) voted for the 2009 omnibus
spending measure. 156 Moreover, in the House, all four Democrats from Oregon
voted in favor of the bill. 157 Congressman Peter DeFazio (D-Oregon), a leading
opponent to the 2007 pilot program, remarked:
Virtually every member of Congress..., both Democrat and Republican,
expressed seriods concerns about this pilot program and the potential for
compromised safety on our U.S. highways. I have always opposed NAFTA, and
have long been alarmed at the prospect of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers
operating beyond the current 20-mile commercial zone at our southern border. I
am not confident that Mexican-owned trucking companies will meet U.S. safety
and environmental standards. 158
In an open letter to President Obama, Congressman DeFazio described Mexico's
policy of cross-sector retaliation as "illegal" and "nothing more than political
gamesmanship."1
59
Ohio is another strategically important state targeted by Mexican import
duties. In 2006, 317,000 Ohio jobs were export-related, accounting for 6.7
percent of the state's private sector employment. 160 Some of the largest exports
from the state are jellies and jams manufactured by Smucker's, Inc., and
household products such as deodorants, shampoos, and other products
manufactured by Proctor & Gamble Co. 161 The Mexican government has
Mar. 19, 2009.
154. Robbie DeMesio, Mexico's new tariffs could cost Oregon millions, THE OREGONIAN,
Mar. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2009/03/mexicantariffs-will cost oreg.html.
155. Id.
156. Senate Roll Call Vote, supra note 152.
157. Office of the Clerk, Final Results for Roll Call 86, available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2009/rol1086.xml (last visited Mar. 17, 2010); see also GovTrak, House
Vote on Passage H.R. 1105 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2009-86 (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (hereinafter
Final Results for Roll Call 86].
158. DeFazio Examines Cross-Border Trucking in Hearing Today, Press Release, U.S.
Representative Peter DeFazio, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.defazio. house.gov/index.php?option--content&task=view&id=274.
159. Eric Adams & Wayne Havrelly, DeFazio Protests Mexican Tariffs on Oregon Products,
KGW.COM NEWSCHANNEL 8 PORTLAND, Aug. 15, 2009, available at
http:llwww.kgw.comnewslnational/5949141 7.html.
160. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, International Trade Administration: Industry Trade Data and
Analysis, Employment Related to Manufactured Exports (2006), available at
http://www.trade.gov/td/industry/otea/jobs[Reports/2006/jobs-bystate.html.
161. Id.
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imposed a 20 percent tariff on preserved fruit, which is a key ingredient of Ohio-
produced jellies and jams, and a 15 percent duty on household products. 162
Exports of paper products, including self-copy paper, notebook paper, and
bathroom tissue also have been targeted with a 10 percent tariff increase,
affecting major producers such as Ohio-based Chillicothe Paper Products, which
has annual sales of $338 million. 163 Senator Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), a
longtime opponent of NAFTA, voted in favor of the 2009 omnibus spending
measure. 164
To the surprise of many officials, products from North Dakota also were
included on the Mexican Tariff List. North Dakota has very little trade with
Mexico compared to other states, and its exports of sunflower seeds, oil, and soy
products account for fewer jobs than other products targeted under the Mexican
Tariff List. Nevertheless, Mexico has levied a 20 percent tariff on soy products
and 15 percent duties on sunflower seeds and oilcake residue. 165 North Dakota
was targeted because its entire Democratic delegation - Senator Kent Conrad,
Senator Byron Dorgan, and Congressman Earl Pomeroy - voted for the 2009
omnibus spending measure. 166 As discussed above, Senator Dorgan has led the
charge against the pilot program since its inception. Shortly after voting for the
2009 omnibus spending measure, he declared:
Tonight's vote is a victory for safety. It also represents a tuming of the tide on
the senseless, headlong rush this country has been engaged in for some time, to
dismantle safety standards and a quality of life it took generations to achieve. It
also rejects the Administration's action to push a program many of us believe
would compromise the safety of American drivers. Tonight, commerce - for a
change - did not trump safety. Because my amendment is identical to language
already included in the House-passed version of this bill, I expect this provision
will not be altered in the House-Senate conference committee and that we have,
effectively, stopped this pilot program. I thank every Senator who voted tonight
to stand up for the safety of American drivers on America's roadways.1 67
The Wall Street Journal later questioned a Mexican official about Senator
Dorgan's remarks after the release of the Mexican Tariff List, and that official
explained "[t]here was no way for us to be tougher on his state without hurting
Mexican consumers."1 68
Other states with powerful Democratic lawmakers have been targeted as
well. In Illinois, home to President Obama, shampoo and sunglasses have been
162. Mexico Retaliation List, supra note 146.
163. Jonathan Riskind, Mexico vs. Brown?, TRADE OBSERVATORY, Mar. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cftn?RefliD=1 05616.
164. Senate Roll Call Vote, supra note 152.
165. Mexico Retaliation List, supra note 146.
166. Senate Roll Call Vote, supra note 152; Final Results for Roll Call 86, supra note 157.
167. Press Release, Byron Dorgan, Statement by U.S. Senator Byron Dorgan on Vote to Stop
Mexican Truck Pilot Program (Sept. 11, 2007), available at
http://dorgan.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=282361.
168. Conkey, supra note 146.
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hit with 15 percent duties. 169 Printed books from New York (home to Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton) and bowling equipment from Nevada (home to Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid) have been targeted with tariff hikes. 170 In
Connecticut, Duracell - one of America's premier battery companies - has been
targeted with a 20 percent import duty on primary batteries, electric storage
batteries, spent primary batteries, and spent electric storage batteries. 171 Most
of the Congressional delegation from Connecticut voted in favor of the 2009
omnibus spending measure, including Democratic Steering Committee
Chairwoman Rosa DeLauro. 172 These officials play an important role in
shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. Ricardo Alday, spokesman for the
Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., stated that pressuring key U.S.
lawmakers "is one of the main considerations, but it is not the only one."1 73
Mexican officials have been cautious not to allow the trucking dispute to
exacerbate problems in areas affected by the global economic downturn.
Specifically, Mexico left untouched the largest U.S. exports to Mexico, such as
auto parts and appliances which could have caused further damage to troubled
companies such as Ford and Whirlpool from Michigan. In addition, they have
avoided placing duties on food products most vital to Mexican consumers such
as chicken, pork, and beef.174 Mexican officials would prefer that Congress
restart the trucking program without a trade war that could prove costly to
Mexico as well. 175 Jorge Montano, former Mexican ambassador to the United
States, declared that "[g]oing to commercial war is a ridiculous thing which
hurts both sides." 176
B. Strategic Cross-Sector Retaliation and U.S. Compliance with NAFTA
In the limited number of cases in which strategic cross-sector-retaliation
has been applied by an injured party, the offending party has either withdrawn or
modified the offending restriction rather than risk incurring the pain of targeted
sanctions. The disputes over steel, bananas, and off-shore Internet gambling
have shown that no matter how weak the injured party may be, a powerful
player in the international system can be forced to alter its protectionist policies
if economic sanctions are pinpointed to inflict maximum harm. Cross-sector
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. GovTrack, House Vote On Passage: H. Res. 184: Providing for consideration of the bill
(HR_ 1105) making omnibus appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009 and for
other purposes (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpdvote=h2009-
85.
173. Conkey, supra note 146.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id
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retaliation's record of success in the WTO is at the heart of Mexico's decision to
utilize this remedy to pressure the United States to comply with its NAFTA
obligations. Thus far, this approach has had some impact on the political
climate in Washington, D.C., prompting calls from Republican members of
Congress for an immediate solution to the problem.
There are signs that the Obama administration would prefer to reopen the
border to Mexican trucking rather than risk incurring further sanctions from
Mexico and alienating powerful lawmakers on Capitol Hill. 177 During a recent
"Three Amigos" summit between the United States, Mexico and Canada in
Guadalajara, President Obama told Mexico's president Felipe Calderon that he
is committed to resolving the trucking dispute and would work "to try to move
forward" with a new trucking program. 17 8 However, no specific plan or time
frame was discussed. In addition, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood has
been meeting with members of Congress in an effort to craft legislation that
would reopen the border to Mexican trucking. 179 The administration has urged
Mexican officials to hold off on the new tariffs until this new legislation is put in
place.
It has been a long and difficult road for the U.S.-Mexican relationship on
the issue of cross-border trucking rights, but it appears that this road is coming
to an end. Based on recent statements by President Obama and members of his
Cabinet, it is only a matter of time until the United States brings its cross-border
trucking policy in line with NAFTA. Eventually, both sides will claim victory
once the dispute is resolved. But the reason for the change in U.S. policy should
be attributed to the power of strategic cross-sector retaliation as a tool to
promote compliance with international trade agreements.
177. See Low Expectations Exceeded, supra note 73.
178. CBS/AP, Obama, Calderon Meet in Mexico, CBSNEWS, Aug. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/09/world/main5228536.shtml. See also Nicholas Johnston
& Jens Erik Gould, Obama Promises Solution to U.S.-Mexico Trucking Spat, supra note 84. The
summit was overshadowed by larger security issues, including mounting drug violence along the
border, the outbreak of HINI influenza and the poor state of the U.S. and Mexican economies.
Mexico is floundering in its attempt to deal with its violent drug war, which has claimed more than
6,000 lives. There have been numerous Congressional hearings in Washington, D.C. over how to
prevent the spread of violence across the border into Texas, Arizona, California and New Mexico.
Texas Governor Rick Perry has been urging President Obama to deploy U.S. troops to the border.
See Taking on the Narcos, and Their American Guns, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, at 42-43.
Moreover, Obama, Calderon and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper have pledged further
cooperation to handle an expected new wave of swine flu cases this fall. See Calderon's Hatful of
Troubles, THE ECONOMIST, July 11, 2009, 37-38, available at http://www.highbearrLcom/doc/lGl-
203294142.html; Steve Holland & Patricia Zengerle, "Three Amigos" Talk Trade, HINI and Drugs
in Mexico, REUTERS, Aug. 10, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN10470175.
179. See Obama Promises Solution to U.S.-Mexico Trucking Spat, supra note 84.
2010]
342 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
VII.
CONCLUSION
Mexico's recent decision to employ strategic cross-sector retaliation against
the United States in response to the U.S. suspension of the 2007 Cross-Border
Trucking Development (Pilot) Program is a significant development in NAFTA
relations. Never before has a NAFTA member imposed sanctions in this way to
pressure a fellow member to comply with its NAFTA obligations. To date, this
remedy has been utilized only in two WTO cases - the EU-Ecuador Bananas
case and the U.S.-Antigua online gambling case - to promote compliance with
international trade rules. In both of these asymmetric disputes, the larger state
either withdrew the offending trade measure or modified its commitments to
avoid the political fallout of targeted sanctions back home in unrelated industry
sectors. The WTO's record of success at this final stage of dispute resolution
underpins the Mexican government's decision to utilize this remedy under
NAFTA. Mexico's hope is that targeted import duties on selected goods in key
Democratic states will result in sufficient pressure on Congress and the White
House to restart the trucking program without igniting a trade war. This is a
risky move, but all signs indicate that the U.S. government is moving closer to
bringing its cross-border trucking policy in line with NAFTA.
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